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FRAUD OR MALICE AS A BASIS FOR CIVIL
IMPRISONMENT
Imprisonment of a judgment debtor on civil process has been retained in
many American jurisdictions as a sanction against the commission of two types
of torts, those involving some element of "malicious" conduct, and those re-
sulting from some fraudulent action by the debtor in the evasion of a judgment
against him.
"Malice," in the sense in which the courts of Illinois' and Vermont2 use it as a
basis for civil imprisonment, does not mean spite or ill will, the common defini-
tion,3 but merely conscious wrongdoing. Thus, torts such as trespass, conver-
sion, fraud and deceit, malicious prosecution, slander, wilful and wanton
negligence, and criminal conversation have all been held to be malicious when
the courts have found them to have been done in utter disregard of the rights of
others.4 In the words of the Illinois Supreme Court, s after it had reviewed and
approved the earlier cases, the term, "malice,"
.... applies to that class of wrongs which are inflicted with an evil intent, design, or
purpose; implies that the guilty party was actuated by improper or dishonest mo-
tives; and requires intentional perpetration of an injury or wrong on another. How-
ever, the term does not necessarily mean that the person committing the injury bears
any spite, grudge, or ill will towards the person against whom the wrong is inflicted.6
The conception of "malice" is analogous to that found in Section 17a(2) of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act,7 which provides that no debts "for wilful and
malicious injuries to the person and property of another" shall be dischargeable
I See In re Blacklidge, 359 Ill. 482, 195 N.E. 3 (1935) (the earlier decisions are here reviewed
and approved); In re Teiszerski, 272 Ill. App. 305 (1933).
2 Fisher v. Com'rs, 3 Vt. 328 (i83o); Whiting v. Dow, 42 Vt. 262 (1869); North Adams Co.
v. Cantor, 103 Vt. 514, 156 Atl. 879 (,931). For the relation of the imprisonment cases to the
bankruptcy problem see In re Cote, 93 Vt. 10, io6 AtI. 5ig (i918).
3 Webster, New International Dictionary 1304 (i933). For thelegal definition, 2 Words and
Phrases 622 (4th ser. 1933).
4 Mullin v. Spangenberg, 118 Ill. 55r, 9 N.E. 208 (i886) (trespass); In re Todd, 246 Ill.
App. 587 (1926) (trespass was not malicious); Nat'l Bank v. Burkett, ioi Ill. 391 (r882)
(fraud and deceit); Greener v. Brown, 323 Ill. 221, 153 N.E. 825 (1926) (trover); Kellar v.
Norton, 228 Ill. 356, 81 N.E. 1037 (io7) (trover-not malicious); Beckman v. Menge, 82
Ill. App. 228 (i899) (malicious prosecution); In re Warnke, 207 Inl. App. 459 (1917) (slander);
Chalukinis v. Jozwiak, 287 Ill. App. 170, 4 N.E. (2d) 782 (1936) (wilful and wanton negli-
gence); Buck v. Alex, 350 Ill. 167, X82 N.E. 794 (1932) (mere negligence-not malicious);
In re Blacklidge, 359 Ill. 482, I95 N.E. 3 (I935) (criminal conversation).
S Lipman v. Goebel, 357 Ill. 315, 192 N.E. 203 (1934).
6 "Malice" in the legal sense includes all those acts which would be considered malicious by
the layman, but it also includes a class of acts which were merely done intentionally without
consideration of duties owed to others. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L.
Rev. i (1894).
742 Stat. 354 (1922), ii U.S.C.A. § 35(2) (1927).
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under the provisions of the act. "The malice here intended is nothing more than
that disregard of duty which is found in the intentional doing of a wilful act to
the injury of another."8 The provisions of this act cover all cases in which the
facts of intent and malice have been judicially ascertained;9 and it is not sur-
prising that a debt arising out of an Illinois adjudication that the debtor com-
mitted a malicious act, will not be dischargeable in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding in the federal court.'0 Although the state court's finding is not res
judicata, the same test of malice will be applied in both courts."r
Civil imprisonment, as it exists today in Illinois,' 2 is based on two statutes-
Chapter 77 on Judgment, Decrees, and Executions and Chapter 72 on In-
solvent Debtors.13 The former provides for an execution against the body of
the defendant "when the judgment shall have been obtained for a tort com-
mitted by such defendant, and it shall appear from a special finding of the
jury .... that malice is the gist of the action and .... when the defendant
shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of creditors."'4 Another sec-
tion of the statute explains this latter clause by telling when and how the execu-
tion may issue if the creditor "verily believes" that the judgment debtor is con-
cealing assets not exempt from execution, and an execution against his property
has been returned unsatisfied. The creditor must make affidavit to the court
stating that "such debtor has estate, goods, chattels, lands and tenements not
exempt from execution, which he refuses to surrender, or that since the debt was
contracted or the cause of action accrued, the creditor has conveyed, concealed,
or otherwise disposed of some part of his estate, with design to secure same to
his own use, or defraud his creditors ....... is If the court approves the af-
fidavit, the body execution will issue. The execution may be had as of right
when there has been a finding of "malice" in a tort action, but the affidavit is
necessary whenever the debtor's fraudulent action prevents the creditor from
levying against non-exempted property.
6
8 Collier, Law and Principles of Bankruptcy § 554 (Gilbert's ed. 1937); Tinker v. Colwell,
193 U.S. 473 (igo4); 15 Minn. L. Rev. 7oo (i931).
9 Collier, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 554.
xo United States ex rel. Weber v. Meyering, 66 F. (2d) 347 (C.C.A. 7th 1933).
11 Lipman v. Goebel, 78 F. (2d) 872 (C.C.A. 7th 1935), cert. den. 294 U.S. 712 (i935). See
note 5 supra.
z2 The subject has been discussed more fully with respect to Illinois by Parnass, Imprison-
ment for Civil Obligations in Illinois, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 559 (1921). In 1935 an amendment, Ill. L.
1935, § i, p. 937, to § 5,of the Judgments statute introduced the requirement of a special find-
ing of malice by the jury as the basis for the issuance of a body execution. Prior to this change
many cases dealt with the determination of "malice," Jernberg v. Mix, 192 Ill. 254, 65 N.E.
242 (1902); Kitson v. People, 132 Ill. 327, 23 N.E. X024 (i8go).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. (,937).
14 1l. Rev. Stat. (i937) c. 77, § 2; Ingalls v. Raklios, 21 N.E. (2d) 856 (Ill. App. 1939).
IS Ill. Rev. Stat. (i937) c. 77, § 65.
6 In re Fetz, 239 Ill. App. 250 (1926).
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The insolvent debtor's act 7 sets up the procedure by which all civil prison-
ers, other than those incarcerated on "malice counts" may seek release from
prison.s The procedure established is similar to that found in federal and state
insolvency statutes, 9 and provides for a petition by the imprisoned debtor,
notification of the creditor, a scheduling of assets, an assignment of these assets
to a third party for the benefit of all creditors, and subsequent discharge of the
debtor from prison, following a hearing in which the creditor may oppose the
discharge if he so desires. 20 Release from imprisonment does not, however, ex-
tinguish the judgment debt, although $1.50 is credited against the debt for each
day the debtor remains in prison.2I Furthermore, the debtor may never be im-
prisoned again on the same judgment. 22 Since a "malice count" prohibits the
prisoner from taking advantage of the insolvent debtor's procedure, he must
remain in jail for six months, the maximum period provided by the act2 3 An
offer by the debtor to surrender his property will be to no avail,4 and it does not
seem to make any difference whether he could satisfy the judgment or not, once
the execution against his person has issued.
Similar procedures for relief from civil imprisonment are found in other
states, although only four, 5 Colorado, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Ver-
mont, contain a provision similar to that of Illinois prohibiting certain classes
of tort debtors from taking advantage of the insolvency act until a fixed time
has elapsed; the legislatures of Colorado, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
enumerate certain specific torts, while the Vermont statute talks in terms of
"wilful and malicious injuries to persons or property.' 6
x7 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 72.
18 Others who may take advantage of this chapter include other tort debtors and debtors
in jail for non-payment of miscellaneous civil obligations-fines, court costs or taxes, and
judgments in bastardy, wife abandonment, or alimony proceedings. See note 41 infra.
19 IlU.S.C.A. §§ 41-61 (1927); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39. Many states have
omitted general insolvency laws from their revised statutes on the theory that the state
statutes have been superseded by the federal bankruptcy act.
2o 1. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 72, §§ 3, 5-7, 9, 13. Should the creditor file a traverse of fraud,
the debtor must submit to a jury trial, but on conviction he may still take advantage of the
provisions of Section 5 of the insolvency act.
21 fli. Rev. Stat. (i937) c. 72, §§ 32-3.
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 72, § 25.
23 1M. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 72, § 33. He may remain longer if he refuses to schedule his
property at the end of six months.
'4Lipman v. Goebel, 357 Ill. 315, 192 N.E. 203 (1934).
2S Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 39, § ioo; R.I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 5475; Vt. Pub. Laws
(1933) §§ 2192, 2208; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 93, § 72-6.
26 Maine does not allow release if the action was for a wilful trespass, Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
C. 124, § 80.
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Although the release statutes vary little from state to state,2 7 the procedures
for imprisonment differ more radically.. Besides the group of states with stat-
utes similar to that of Illinois, two other classifications are apparent.28 One
group of states, including Virginia and Washington, provides that if an execu-
tion against the debtor's property is returned unsatisfied the creditor may ask
for a hearing at which the debtor must answer interrogatories. If he fails to
answer, if he is evasive, or if the court decides that he has property which he
refuses to surrender, the debtor may be cited for contempt and imprisoned.29 A
few other states have an identical procedure, in addition to other provisions for
civil imprisonment, as a supplemental aid, to execution against property.30
Finally, the other and larger group, including New York and California, has
civil imprisonment only for fraudulent conduct.3" The statutes vary to some
extent between states, 3 2 but provide essentially the following procedure: If the
debtor might have been arrested for the action as a prelude to the trial, he may
be imprisoned after the judgment. The defendant may be arrested on an af-
fidavit containing one or more of the following allegations: (i) he is about to
leave the state or about to remove property not exempt from attachment, (2) he
has committed an injury to the person or property of the plaintiff, (3) he has
27 Some states provide for "poor debtor oaths," i.e., the prisoner may be released only if he
takes an oath that he possesses no more than a small amount of money, $20 to $5o, not exempt
from execution. Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2208; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, i937) § 1148.
For other states having assignment procedures similar to Illinois, see Del. Rev. Code (1935)
§ 51o9; S.C. Code (!932) § 854. As it is generally conceded that an oath does not have the
force it formerly had, the latter procedure is considered better suited to modem conditions,
Ginsburg, The Poor Debtor Law, 8 Boston U. L. Rev. 23 (1928).
28 Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana (except for public officers), Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Tennessee, Texas, and the District of Columbia have no provisions for
civil imprisonment. It is noteworthy that many of the states having no laws are southern
or western states, where the debtor class wielded political power at the time (during the
nineteenth century) when statutes of this character were passed, while eastern states, where the
financial interests of the country are centered, have the strictest laws.
29 Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) §§ 6421, 6506; Washington Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington, 1932) § 613. Oklahoma and New Mexico are other states. "Contempt," in the
sense that it is used in these statutes, is the same as civil contempt which is found in every
state as punishment for defiance of decrees of the courts.
30 Oregon, Rhode Island, New York, and Colorado.
31 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937) §§ 478-504, i143-54; Idaho Code Ann. (1932)
§§ 6-ioi---6-I27; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) §§ 6o-347o--60-3479; Nev. Comp.
Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 8643-79; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. 1939) §§ 764,
826; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) §§ 674, 767, 1631; N.D. Comp. L. Ann. (1913) §§ 7489,
77X7, 8483-95; Ohio Code (Throckmorton, 1936) §§ 1744-53; S.C. Code (1932) §§ 2384,
2636, 3o3o; Wis. Stat. (Y937) §§ 272.10, 264.0r, c. 336; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright,
1931) §§ 89-2902, 89-32oI-8g-323o.
32 The statutes of some states exempt women from body execution if they have not been
arrested before trial, N.Y. Civ. Prac. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. T939) § 765. Cf. Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. (Deering, 1937) §§ 478-504, in which there is no such provision.
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fraudulently concealed, conveyed, converted, or otherwise disposed of some of
his assets in fraud of creditors, (4) he is accused of the breach of a promise to
marry, (5) he, an attorney, public officer, or factor, has misapplied or appropri-
ated to his own use funds entrusted to his possession, (6) he has gambled an
amount in excess of $200, or (7) he contracted the debt without intending to
pay it.3 Limitations on the imprisoned debtor's right to take advantage of the
insolvency procedure are negligible as almost all the states in the New York
group provide that the debtor may petition for release within ten to thirty days
after incarceration.34
With the exception of New Jersey, where seducers are imprisoned for three
years without being allowed to follow the statutory insolvency procedure3s only
the states that retain the "malice count" have retained the old practice of civil
imprisonment in a vigorous form. In the other states, the prisoner "takes the
key to his cell with him," and may seek his own release through payment of
the debt or a petition of insolvency.
The procedures for imprisonment under civil process have been held not to
infringe the state constitutional limitations and prohibitions against imprison-
ment for debt.36 Thirty-nine state constitutions contain these limitations, al-
though expressing them in various forms.37 Someprohibit imprisonment for debt;
others limit it to cases in which "there is a high presumption of fraud."' - In the
nine states39 which have no constitutional limitations, the statutory provisions
differ little from those found in other states. Most courts have interpreted the
prohibition against imprisonment for debt to apply to contract but not to tort
judgments.40 Even the courts of the states prohibiting imprisonment on both
33 Not all of the seven categories are to be found in all the states of this group. The Oregon
legislature has provided a similar procedure for the arrest of the defendant, but does not make
any regulation for the execution against the body after judgment, Ore. Code Ann. (1930) § 4-
101.
34 However, Michigan is unique in that it provides different times when the imprisoned
debtor may petition for release, depending on the size of the judgment against him, Mich.
Comp. Laws (1929) § 15366.
3s N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 2, c. 35, § 27.
36 In re Blacklidge, 359 Ill. 482, 195 N.E. 3 ('935); Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 6o S.E.
19 (i9o8); Thuringer v. Bonner, 74 Colo. 539, 222 Pac. 11z8 (1924); Bray v. State, I4O Ala.
72, 37 So. 250 (1903).
37 See Index Digest of State Constitutions 759 (N.Y. St. Const. Conv. Com'n, 1g9s).
38 Illinois Const. art. 2, § 12.
39 Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
40 People v. Cotton, I4 Ill. 424 (1853); Buck v. Alex, 350 Ill. 167, 182 N.E. 794 (1932).
For a more complete analysis see footnotes to Modem Survival of Imprisonment for Debt,
37 Yale LJ. 509, 512 (1928). See also 41 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1928). These two notes analyze
in a more complete manner the constitutional remnants of imprisonment for debt. Cf. Bron-
son v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 153 Pac. 1o39 (x95) (a tort judgement is a "debt").
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contract and tort judgments have held that the phrase does not apply to the
non-payment of fines, penalties, taxes, or court costs--debts owed to the state.4
Imprisonment for contempt of a court order to pay over a specific fund is not
"imprisonment for debt" within the meaning of the constitutional provisions,42
although confinement for contempt of an order to pay a sum of money, e.g., an
order following a decree of specific performance against the purchaser under a
land contract, is not permitted.43
The so-called "malice count" in Illinois and the extended period in which a
defendant must remain in jail for non-payment of judgments for certain speci-
fied torts in a few other states provides a quasi-criminal procedure as the result
of a civil action. Montana has recognized the criminal nature of these proceed-
ings by making conveyances in fraud of creditors a misdemeanor.44 Imprison-
ment for any type of offense is frequently justified by stating that it is punish-
ment for some unlawful act or omission. Perhaps a better reason is that it
serves as a deterrent and acts as a stimulus to proper behavior in order to pro-
tect an important public interest.4s In fact, the principal advantage of civil
imprisonment, as of other civil punishment such as punitive damages,46 is that
it tends to deter oppressive conduct, such as slanders, assaults, and minor
cruelties, which are theoretically criminally punishable, but which in actual
practice frequently are ignored by prosecutors perhaps occupied with more
serious crimes.47 Because of this criminal nature, it would be natural to expect
41 Kennedy v. People, 122 Ill. 649, 13 N.E. 213 (x887) (fine, court costs); Ruggles v. State,
120 Md. 553, 87 Atl. Io8o (1913) (fine for not securing a license); Leonard v. Bolton, x53 Mass.
428 (i89o) (penalty assessed following a bastardy action); Chicago v. Morell, 247 Ill. 383, 93
N.E. 295 (1910) (wheel-tax); In re Diehl, 8 Cal. App. 5I, 96 Pac. 98 (19o8) (license tax);
Ex parte Robertson, 39 Tex. Crim. 628, i S.W. 669 (i889) (court costs).
It is suggested that the imprisonment in these cases is justified not on the basis that it is
for debt but for neglect or refusal to perform a moral or legal duty, the performance of which
is within the ability of the debtor, 3 Freeman, Executions 2395 (3d ed. igo9). This reasoning
might also explain the instances in which imprisonment follows a fraudulent evasion of the
execution against the property of the debtor.
42 Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 292 Ill. App. 434, Ix N.E. (2d) 657 (1937) (failure to pay over
a trust fund).
43 People ex rel. Sarlay v. Pope, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y. Supp. 414 (1930).
44 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 11435.
4s Sutherland, Criminology c. 10 (1924). 46 McCormick, Damages c. io (i93i).
47 Although the argument has never been presented to the Illinois court, it is suggested that
imprisonment on a "malice count" in a civil suit following acquittal in a criminal trial for the
same offense is a violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois state
constitutions. One Illinois case, White v. Youngblood, 367 Ill. 632, 12 N.E. (2d) 650 (i937),
did actually result in the defendant's being imprisoned on a "malice count" after being
acquitted of a criminal charge for the same offense. This second proceeding seems to approach
very near the point of placing the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The real
obstacle in invoking this doctrine is in establishing the criminal nature of the "malice count"
proceeding. That it is criminal is arguable on the basis of the imprisonment which results.
The only justification for imprisonment according to modem sociologists, is punishment for the
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that the guaranties which have been developed in favor of the accused person
on trial for a crime4S would be preserved, especially in view of the general feeling
that the taking-away of a person's freedom is an extremely severe punishment.
Nevertheless, the usual guaranties in a criminal trial do not exist in behalf of a
person defending against a claim of tort with a "malice count," although as a
result of non-payment of a judgment against the defendant he can be im-
prisoned.49
The provisions of the insolvent debtors act, prohibiting debtors in jail on
"malice counts" from taking advantage of its provisions, have been tested
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In one case a judgment had been entered against the defendant
for breaking into the plaintiff's office and converting certain valuable papers;
he was imprisoned for non-payment and sought release by surrendering his
assets. The county court refused his petition, stating that "malice was the gist
of the action," and denied him release through the statutory insolvency proce-
dure. The defendant contended, on appeal, that the insolvent debtor's act ar-
bitrarily discriminated against him since it excluded "malicious" tort debtors
from the benefits of the statute, but the court held that the act treated all per-
sons in the same position in like manner, and was, therefore, constitutional.
The result of the case was that the defendant remained in jail for the maximum
statutory period in spite of his willingness to surrender what property he had.So
Civil imprisonment serves two purposes: to induce payment of a certain
type of judgment, which the legislature believed should be satisfied promptly,
under the threat of imprisonment, and to give the judgment creditor a legal
means of satisfying a desire for revenge against his debtor. That the former
result is important in a credit economy no one will doubt, but the latter must
be condemned as a vestige of the ancient philosophy that allowed one to seek
vengeance upon a fellow man who had wronged him.s'
violation of an important public interest. Thus, it would seem that civil imprisonment, if it
can only be justified on the criminal law theory of punishment, is really penal in nature. And
the Supreme Court of the United States took exactly this view in Von Hoffman v. Quincy,
4 Wail. (U.S.) 535 (1867), where Mr. justice Swayne stated: "The right to imprison for debt
is not part of the contract. It is regarded as penal rather than remedial. The states may
abolish it whenever they think proper."
48 See U.S. Const. am. 5, 6; Ill. Const. art. 2, §§ 8-io. Further, note that most courts hold
that a person accused of a crime be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, that he never can be convicted by default, and that the state may not appeal an
acquittal.
49 The procedure on charge of fraud in non-payment of an execution against property will be
civil, Morse v. O'Hara, 247 Mass. 183, 142 N.E. 4o (1924). See Parnass, op. cit. supra note 12.
so Lipman v. Goebel, 357 Ill. 315, 192 N.E. 203 (1934).
51 For the general history of imprisonment for debt, see Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25
Mich. L. Rev. 24 (1926).
